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Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support

NOTES

THE BARBER DECISION: A QUESTIONABLE
APPROACH TO TERMINATION OF LIFESUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR THE PATIENT IN
A PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in medical technology and science have
placed us on the threshold of a new terrain - the penumbra
where death begins but life, in some form, continues. l Science
and technology enable physicians to artifically maintain respiration when the patient's capacity to breathe spontaneously has
been lost. 2 Artificially maintained patients such as those patients in a persistent vegetative state may never recover consciousness. A persistent vegetative state occurs when rudimentary brain stem functions remain but the major components of
cerebral function, e.g., cognitive processes, are irreversibly lost
and when chances for recovery are indeterminable. 3 Therefore,
1. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1980).
This case was decided by the Court of Chancery, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) after the
Delaware Supreme Court determined that the lower court had the power to authorize
the removal of life-support systems. 421 A.2d 1342-43.
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, 3 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH]. For further discussion of the types of machines available, see
M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW (1981).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2, at 18. Such persons may
exhibit spontaneous, involuntary movements such as yawns or facial grimaces, their eyes
may be open and they may be capable of breathing without assistance. The condition is
often described as awake but unaware since any apparent wakefulness does not represent
awareness of self or environment. Id. Persons in a persistent vegetative state are considered to be permanently unconscious. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS, 173
(1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT]. However, there is still uncertainty about any judgment that a par-
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as a result, we are now compelled to distinguish between death,
as we have known it, and death in which the body lives in some
fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) does not.' Attempts by attorneys, physicians, and clergy to draw this distinction have been made~ with varying degrees of success.
Even where it is possible to make this distinction, serious
medical, ethical, and legal issues remain with regard to the type
and level of treatment provided to these patients. s For example,
there is no single applicable law which exists to authorize a physician to terminate life-support systems for a patient in a persistent vegetative state. 7 It is precisely this issue - that there are no
ticular patient's state is permanent:
The first uncertainty affects any scientific proposition
about as-yet-unobserved cases. No matter how extensive the
past evidence is for an empirical generalization, it may yet be
falsified by future experience. Certainty in prognosis is always
a matter of degree, typically based upon the quantity and
quality of the evidence from which a prediction is made.
Second, this empirical qualification is especially serious in
predictions about unconsciousness because the evidence relevant to a prognosis of permanence is still quite limited. The
overall number of such patients is small, and most cases have
not been carefully studied or adequately reported. Furthermore, the number of variables affecting prognosis (for example, the cause of unconsciousness, the patient's age and other
diseases, the length of time the patient has been unconscious,
and the kinds of therapy applied) is large and imperfectly
understood.
Finally, any prediction that a patient will not regain consciousness before dying, regardless of the treatment undertaken, contains an implicit assumption about future medical
breakthroughs. Since some such patients can be maintained
alive for extended periods of time (often years rather than
days, weeks, or months), this assumption about treatment innovations can be a long-range one. At the moment, however, it
introduces only a very small uncertainty, since the possibility
of repairing the neurologic injuries that destroy consciousness
is exceedingly remote.
[d. at 176-77.
4. 421 A.2d at 1342.
5. See generally supra note 3.
6. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2; LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS, (A.E. DOUDERA
& J.D. PETERS, eds. 1982); M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2; THE HASTINGS
CENTER, THE HASTINGS CENTER'S BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ETHICS, BIOMEDICS, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1984); D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF DEATH AND DYING (1981)
for a discussion of medical, legal and ethical issues.
7. See generally supra notes 3 and 6.
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legal standards for the termination of life-support systems for
the patient in a persistent vegetative state - which poses serious
problems for the treating physicians. This lack of standards
leaves the physician at risk for civil and criminal liability, as
well as professional, ethical, and moral sanctions. Moreover, patients and their relatives are without the ability to control the
patient's course of treatment. A California Court of Appeal for
the Second District has recently taken a major step in addressing these issues in Barber v. Superior Court.s The Barber court
found that the withdrawal of all life-support systems (respirator,
nutrition and hydration) from a patient in a persistent vegetative state within only five days, was not an unlawful failure to
perform a legal duty where the patient had virtually no chance
of recovery.9
This Note will review the major cases dealing with termination of life-support systems for patients in a persistent vegetative state. Although the discussion will focus primarily on these
patients, many of the issues discussed are applicable to other
patients in similar situations, i.e., those who have terminal cancer. The Note will specifically relate case law from the other
states to the facts and holdings of Barber, the most recent California case in this area. Finally, in light of the various legal approaches taken by California and other states regarding termination of life-support systems for these patients, this Note will
propose some alternatives to the Barber decision.
II.

BACKGROUND

Fundamental to any consideration of withdrawal of life-support systems is the definition of death. Historically, the standard
for defining death was the permanent cessation of respiration
and circulation. Io Because of advances in medical technology,
the law has shifted its emphasis toward a definition of brain
death, recognizing cerebral function as that function which most
clearly delineates human life. l l The medically accepted defini8. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
9. [d. at 1020-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
10. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING DEATH, supra note 2, at 3.
11. See M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2, at 24-42 for a discussion of this
shift in emphasis and the concepts and policy consequences involved in a determination
of death.
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tion of brain death is an "'irreversible loss of all brain function.' "12 Although there is no uniform law, 26 states have
adopted legislation based on the Uniform Determination of
Death Act, recognizing the absence of brain function as an acceptable criterion for the definition of death. 13 Further treatment of a patient who is brain dead is unnecessary in those
jurisdictions. 14
The definition of brain death excludes those patients who
continue to exhibit lower brain function, but remain in a persistent vegetative state, will not regain consciousness, cannot
speak, think, or feel but who breathe and maintain basic metabolic functions of body temperature, circulation and elimination. III Thus, termination of treatment for a patient in a persistent vegetative state would be homocide under California
statutes. 16 The Barber case is illustrative of this type of situa12. Black, Brain Death, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338, 338·39 (1978). A total irreversi·
ble absence of all brain function is necessary. Some 30 different criteria have been proposed for the diagnosis of brain death, the most accurate and widely accepted being the
"Harvard Criteria." Under the "Harvard Criteria," brain death is diagnosed upon the
concurrence of four general conditions: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsivity to externally
applied intense stimuli; (2) no movenlent or breathing; (3) no relexes, and (4) flat or
isoelectric electroencephalogram. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 34-35.
13. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 27. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Washington and Wyoming have adopted legislation recognizing
the absence of brain function as acceptable criteria for the definition of death. Id. at 27
n.16. California's brain death statute states: "[aln individual who has sustained ... irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead."
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1984). The statute also requires that a
second physician independently confirm the death and neither physician be involved in
decisions regarding the transplantation of organs. Id. § 7181-7182.
14. 147 Cal. App. 3d. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
15. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 27. When deprived of oxygen, the human brain dies
in stages rather than all at once. The cortex is the most sensitive portion of the brain
and, therefore, the first to die with the deprivation of normal oxygenated blood flow.
This is the site of the highest centers of human intelligence. Some authorities believe
that the lack of oxygen flow to the brain for a period of 4 to 6 minutes will result in a
total and irreversible loss of cortical brain functions. However, the loss of oxygenated
blood for a similar period of time may have no effect on the lower brain or brain stem,
which is the part of the brain tissue that controls respiration, heart rate, and blood pressure. Id. at 24-25.
16. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought." CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1984). The Barber court found that in the
situation where the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and the patient's family
consents, the doctor has no legal duty to maintain life-sustaining techniques including
intravenous therapy. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484. Lacking this duty, there
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tion. In Barber, the patient's brain stem was functioning so that
the standard of brain death did not apply.I7 Complicating the
lack of legal standards, is the difficulty in establishing with medical certainty when a persistent vegetative state exists. IS The decision to withhold or to withdraw life-support systems in these
cases requires analysis of several issues. These issues include:
the right of the incompetent patient in a persistent vegetative
state to refuse treatment, the level of treatment that should be
provided to the patient, the determination as to when treatment
should be withheld, and who should make the decisions. Moreover, a clarification in terminology is important because it would
allow physicians and the courts to characterize their conduct towards a patient with precision. I9

A.

The Right To Refuse Treatment

Central to any discussion of what treatments can be withheld from those in a persistent vegetative state is the concept
that the individual has a right to refuse treatment. The right of
self-determination is a right basic in American law and generally
includes the right of a competent adult to reject life saving medical care. 20 This has been stated succinctly by Judge Cardozo, in
the frequently-cited formulation: "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
can be no criminal liability when all life-support is discontinued. The court concluded
that discontinuing futile treatment is not unlawful homocide. However, this holding
should not be considered definitive since it is binding only on California's lower courts
and for federal courts applying California law. The law in this extremely sensitive area
must be regarded as unsettled until the California Supreme Court or the legislature set
the final rules. Rubsamen, A Landmark Case on the Physician's Duty to Maintain Life,
PROF. LIABiLiTY NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1983. See also CALiFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, CONSENT MANUAL, 55, 61-64 (1984 ed.) for further discussion on the implications of the Barber case and the potential for criminal liability because of the lack of clear legislative
guidance in this area.
A physician is exempt from this liability when there has been either (1) a designation of an attorney-in-fact for medical decisions under CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West.
Supp. 1984), see infra notes 100-05, or (2) a binding directive signed according to the
Natural Death Act under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West. Supp. 1984),
see infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
17. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
18. See supra note 3.
19. M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2, at 573-74.
20. J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL, 32 (1983).
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he is liable in damages."21 The right to reject life saving medical
care has been found by some state courts to be part of the fundamental constitutional right of privacy.22 It is necessary, however, to reconcile the individual's right to refuse treatment (right
of privacy) with the state's interest in preserving life. 23 There is
a substantial distinction between the state's insistence that
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to
a case where there is an incurable illness. 24 It follows, then, that
if competent persons may refuse treatment in certain situations,
such as when the treatment merely prolongs the moment of dying but does not provide a substantial benefit, the same right,
extended through a substitute judgment test, should be afforded
to those who are incompetent since the value of human dignity
extends equally to both. 21i This right has been recognized by sev21. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129·30, 105 N.E. 92
(1914), overruled on other grounds, in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957). '
22. J, ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 33. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert, denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976): Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980): Severns v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1981); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). The right to refuse life
saving treatment has been discussed extensively. See Sherlock, For Everything There is
a Season: The Right to Die in the United States, 1982 BY,U, L. REV, 545·616; Note, A
Patient's Last Rights· Termination of Medical Care· An Analysis of New York's In re
Storar, 46 ALB, L. REV. 1380·413 (1982); Brown, Therefore Choose Death, 10 HUM, RTs,
39·45 (1982). At times courts have found the existence of dependant third parties, such
as children, to be the basis for overriding a patient's refusal to accept life saving care.
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.) reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
23. 373 Mass. at 744·45, 370 N.E.2d at 427. The state has a claimed interest in (1)
the preservation of life, (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties, (3)
the prevention of suicide, and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profes·
sion. Id, at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
24. Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 425·26. However, in a recent California case, Bartling v.
Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984), the Court of Appeal for
the Second District, took a major step forward in expanding the right to refuse treat·
ment for a competent adult patient who, although seriously ill, was not terminal. The
court found that this type of patient's constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy in·
cludes the right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 195·97 & n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225·26
& n.8. While the Bartling case represents a significant step towards an individual's right
of self determination, it is limited to competent adult patients and not applicable to
patients in a persistent vegetative state. For a discussion on the Bartling case, see Annas,
Prisoner in the ICU: The Tragedy of William Bartling, 14 HASTINGS CTR, REP, 6, 28·29
(1984).
25. Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 428. "To presume that the incompetent person must
always be subjected to what many rational and intelligent persons may decline is to
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eral state supreme courts for those patients who are in a persistent vegetative state or who are terminally ill. 28
B. Standards for Terminating Treatment for Patients in
a Persistent Vegetative State
1.

Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatments

The traditional test employed in decisionmaking regarding
the requirement that a given treatment be provided to a patient
is whether the treatment is ordinary or extraordinary.27 Historically, this distinction emerged in the Roman Catholic tradition
to differentiate optional treatment from treatment that was obligatory for medical professionals to offer and patients to accept. 28
Under these terms, treatments have been distinguished according to their simplicity, invasiveness, naturalness, and expense. 2D
Thus, a painful, intrusive treatment (such as use of a respirator)
that would merely prolong a very impaired life would probably
not be required, but treatment (such as the administration of
intravenous fluids) that would keep the patient alive without undue suffering or risk of harm, although it would not relieve incompetency, could not be withheld. 30 This concept of extraordinary treatment was used in In re Quinlan,31 the seminal case
downgrade the status of the incompetent by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human
worth and vitality." Id. See generally infra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substitute judgment test.
26. Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432; Severns, 421 A.2d at 1340; In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120, 660 P.2d at
742.
27. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS, supra note 6, at 73.
28. Lynn & Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water? 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 19 (1983) (citing JAMES J. MCCARTNEY, The Development of the Doctrine of Ordinary and Extraordinary Means of Preserving Life in Catholic Moral Theology Before the Karen Quinlan Case, LINACRE QUARTERLY 47 (1980), 215ff).
29. Lynn & Childress, supra note 28, at 19. The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" are extremely vague and used inconsistently in literature. See generally M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, JR., supra note 2 at 726-28.
30. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 50-51.
31. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. The patient, Karen Quinlan, suffered from irreversible
brain damage resulting from two 15 minute periods when she stopped breathing. The
actual cause of the respiratory arrest was unknown. She was determined to be in a petsistent vegetative state. Medical experts believed she could not survive without a respirator. She had previously expressed her distaste for continuation of life by extraordinary
medical procedures. Her father brought suit to be appointed as guardian and to request
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regarding the treatment of those who exist in a persistent vegetative state. The Quinlan court found the use of a respirator on
a 22 year old woman in a persistent vegetative state for over
eleven months was extraordinary treatment. 32
The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" incorporate a
conclusion as to whether the benefits of the treatment justify its
burdens but fail to indicate which medical treatments are required in any given case. 83 Courts need further refinement of
these broad terms. In considering the effect of discontinuing lifesupport systems, prudence dictates that the balance of benefits
and burdens be directly addressed. 34 In partial recognition of
this problem, some courts require major weight be given to the
needs and interests of the incompetent patient, rather than the
needs and interests of families, doctors and society, with whom
the patient's interests may conflict. 311
2. Substituted Judgment and Best Interests Tests
The majority of courts that have addressed the question of
terminating treatment for the incompetent person have adopted
the substituted judgment test. 86 This test attempts to treat the
incompetent patient as an individual (capable of making informed choices) by asking what he would choose if cognizant of
his interests and able to communicate. 87 Where the patient,
while competent, has previously made his wishes regarding
treatment known, the court has a basis for inferring the wishes
removal of the respirator. Id.
32. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668. The use of a respirator can be considered ordinary in
the context of a possibly curable patient, but extraordinary in the context of the forced
sustaining of cardiorespiratory functions of an irreversibly doomed patient. Id.
33. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 50.
34.Id.
35. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417, where the courts took this approach.
36. Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1967);
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647; In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981). In essence, the doctrine of substituted judgment, in its original inception, called
on the court to " 'don the mental mantle of the incompetent.' " Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
752,370 N.E.2d at 431 (citing In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962».
37. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51. This test is helpful when the patient is in a
persistent vegetative state and has not designated an attorney-in-fact with power over
health care decisions. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 644.
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of the patient. 38 If, however, the patient has not made his wishes
clear, those close to the patient can provide the court with their
feelings about what the patient would have wanted if competent. 39 The goal of the substituted judgment test is to maximize
the individual's right of self-determination and privacy.4o
Another approach is the best interests test, which is perhaps
less confusing to decisionmakers in those cases where there has
been no prior expression of preference by the patient. 41 Instead
of determining what the patient's choice would be under the circumstances, this test involves a determination of whether the
treatment, in light of the extended life made possible and the
burden of this extended life, serves the patient's best interests}2
In fact, the substituted judgment test (a subjective approach)
and best interests test (an objective approach) should often
reach identical results for an i~competent patient, who, if competent and able to make intelligent choices, would presumably
choose that which would best serve his interests. 43 The substituted judgment and best interests tests recognize the right of a
competent adult to reject lifesaving medical care and extend this
right to the incompetent patient}4

C. Application of the Standards
1.

Withdrawal of Respirators and Intravenous Feeding
Devices

In some states medical treatment involving the use of respirators, surgery, and chemotherapy may be legally terminated or
withheld from incompetent patients by the application of the
substituted judgment test to determine what the patient would
38. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51. For example, in the Eichner case, Brother
Fox had previously indicated that if he were in a persistent vegetative state, he would
want a respirator removed. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd sub nom., In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
39. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 347.
40. Id. at 277.
41. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51.
42.Id.
43. J. ROBERTSON, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 73 (1976).
44. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 51-52.
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have chosen if competent. 411 However, there is less legal'6 and
medical" agreement as to whether other less invasive forms of
medical care, (such as nutrition, hydration, and antibiotics) can
be withheld. If the basis for stopping treatment is its intrusive
or burdensome nature, and not a decision concerning quality of
life, then medical treatments that do not impose this burden but
which do extend life, could not legitimately be withheld from
patients such as those in a persistent vegetative state. 4S However, if continued life, regardless of how easily sustained, is not
in the best interests of the patient, there seems to be little justification in continuing to provide nutrition and hydration for
those patients identified as being in a persistent vegetative
state. 49 Also, if there is no legal requirement to use a respirator
to supplant a patient's breathing functions because of a hopeless
and terminal prognosis, there appears to be little obligation to
require continued artificial intravenous feeding. IIO
45. Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266; Leach v. Akron General Medical Center,
68 Ohio Misc. I, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 49, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 660 P.2d 738. There have been a limited number of cases that have treated this
issue and have reached this consensus. In the absence of case law and statute, this right
is not recognized in other jurisdictions.
46. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 55. A related issue with unique considerations involves decisions
to discontinue life-sustaining treatment for seriously ill newborns and infants. It is accepted community practice that infants should receive all therapies that are clearly beneficial to them. Decisions should not be withheld on the basis of the infant's anticipated
or actual limited potential or the present and future lack of available community resources. Life-sustaining treatment should not be withheld simply because the infant is
retarded. In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial, the
generally accepted standards require a presumption in favor of treatment. CALIFORNIA
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66e-66p.
48. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 59. Since nutrition and antibiotics do not ordinarily involve such burdens as to make the additional life they provide undesirable, they
would be legally required under this approach. Id.
49. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
supra note 3, at 181, 190 & n.49.
50. See D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 54 (Cum. Supp. 1983). One problem that arises
is how to determine what is a hopeless and terminal prognosis. For example, in the Quinlan case, the physicians believed that withdrawal of the respirator would result in the
patient's death, 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655. She was removed from the respirator in
1976 and continued to live in an extended care facility, until she died of pneumonia at
the age of 31 years. S.F. Chronicle, June 12, 1985, at 1. Likewise, in the Barber case, the
patient's wife testified at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Herbert's physicians said he
would live for approximately a minimum of 30 minutes to a maxiumum of couple of
hours after the respirator was removed. L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1983, Part II at 1.
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Only three cases besides Barber, In re Severns,'n In re Conroy,62 and In re Hier/'s have involved placing or removing intravenous and nasogastric feeding tubes from, or the provision of
nutrition to, comatose, semicomatose, or seriously ill adult patients. In Severns, the patient had been comatose for over five
months when, after an evidentiary hearing, the court concluded
that all medical life-supports, including feeding, could be discontinued if it became necessary to surgically implant a feeding
tube in her trachea [sic].Ci4 In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended the Quinlan holding to allow removal, in certain
circumstances, of all life-sustaining treatment, including feeding,
for elderly incompetent patients who are neither comatose nor
vegetative, but whose mental and physical functioning is severely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy,
even with life-sustaining treatment, is one year or less. 66
51. 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980).
52. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
53. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959, reh'g denied, _ Mass. _, 465 N.E.2d
261 (1984). In Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 22 Ohio Op. 3d
49, 426 N.E.2d 809, a common pleas court (probate division) allowed removal of a respirator from a terminally ill 70 year old woman, but specifically stated that the court's
order removal was only for removal of the respirator and not the other life-supports,
which included a nasogastric tube and a catheter. [d. at 3, 13, 22 Ohio Op. 3d at 49-51,
56, 426 N.E.2d at 810, 816.
54. 425 A.2d at 160. The court apparently misinterpreted the medical data. A feeding tube would not be inserted in the trachea, since the trachea connects with the lungs.
This decision was made following an earlier decision on this case by the Delaware Supreme Court, which concluded that the Court of Chancery (lower court) had the power
to approve to continue or not restore any of Mrs. Severns' life-sustaining systems. 421
A.2d at 1344. The Severns case involved a 55 year old woman who was in a comatose
state as the result of an auto accident and who had previously made it clear she did not
want hopeless treatment to continue. Her husband sought appointment as guardian and
authorization to remove life-sustaining supports. 425 A.2d at 157-58.
55. 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1228, 1231, 1236-37. The court found that this treatment may be withdrawn or withheld when: (1) it is clear that the particular patient
would have refused the treatment under such circumstances involved; or (2) there is
trustworthy evidence that patient would have refused treatment and decisionmaker is
satisfied, that burdens of patient's continued life with treatment outweigh benefits of that
life for patient; or (3) absent any evidence that patient would have refused treatment,
net burdens of patient's life with treatment clearly and markedly outweigh benefits that
patient derives from life. [d. at _, 470 A.2d at 1229, 1232.
However, there remains substantial disagreement among ethicists whether the provision of food and water should ever be considered extraordinary treatment. For example,
to some ethicists both the natural and ordinary quality of feeding requires that it should
never be withdrawn. See HEALY, MEDICAL ETHICS, 61-77 (1960); McFADDEN, MEDICAL
ETHICS, 227-47 (1961); O'DONNELL, MORALS IN MEDICINE, 57, 66-68 (1959). A code of
treatment for severely ill children, drafted by t.he Nassau (N.Y.) Pediatric Society Committee on Ethics and Survival, provides that "ordinary measures are food, fluids, oxygen,
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The Hier case involved an appeal by a guardian ad litem
regarding the correctness of a lower court order relative to surgery for a seriously ill 92 year old woman with a long history of
mental, illness who repeatedly refused to allow placement of a
gastric feeding tube:'6 The Hier court found that it was unnecessary to put an unwilling patient through a major surgical proce~
dure in order to provide adequate nutritional support which
could not be provided by intravenous feeding. II? The distinction
drawn by the Hier court, in contrast to the Conroy and Barber
cases, was between supplying nutritional support with only modest intrusiveness and supplying it through the use of highly intrusive surgical procedures. lls
2. Do Not Resuscitate Orders
In addition to the patient's right to have treatment withdrawn, common practice has also recognized a right to have
treatment withheld, such as the right not to be resuscitated. A
decision not to be resuscitated is accomplished through the use
of a "No Code" or "Do Not Resuscitate" order which specifies
there is to be no resuscitation in the event of a cardiac or pulmonary arrest. liB A "No Code" order was used in the case of In re
antibiotics and pain killers." Waldman, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly III Child, 88
J. PED, 890, 892 (1976). This position was advocated by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop
who stated that: "withholding fluids or nourishment at any time is an immoral act."
TIME. April 11, 1983, at 69.
On the other hand, several scholars are of the opinion that if the patient is beyond
all hope of recovery, the burden of continued feeding is disproportionate to the benefit it
will effect. See WILSON. DEATH BY DECISION 70-71 (1975); Ramsey Prolonged Dying: Not
Medically Indicated, 6 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14 (1976). The American Medical Association
Judicial Council, in Opinion 2.11 (Jan. 10, 1981), reprinted in 45 CONN. MED. 721 (1981),
concluded that when a patient ie i~reversibly comatose or in a permanent vegetative
state, "all means of life support may be discontinued."
56. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 200-01, 464 N.E.2d at 960-61. The tube was required because she suffered from a hiatal hernia and a cervical diverticulum in her esophagus that
impeded her ability to ingest food orally. The tube could be reinserted through the abdomen without surgery if reinsertion was accomplished in a relatively short time. In Mrs.
Hier's case, reinsertion would require surgery. Mrs. Hier's guardian ad litem appealed
from a lower court judgment ordering the appointment of a temporary guardian to consent to the administration of drugs but without authority to consent to the surgery. Id.
57. Id, at 208-10, 465 N.E.2d at 964-65.
58.Id.
59. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 188-89. The use of "No Code" orders has become
generally accepted practice. Nevertheless, it must be understood that no California statutory provisions or precedential judicial decisions expressly approve the use of "No
Code" orders. It is possible that any physician who issues such orders and any hospital
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Dinnerstein,60 where the court held that the law does not prohibit a course of medical treatment which excludes attempts at
resuscitation in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest. 61
The Dinnerstein case involved a 67 year old woman with
Alzheimer's disease who was confined to a hospital in an essentially vegetative state after a stroke. 62 A "No Code" order is not
used when treatment of the patient's underlying illness offers a
hope of restoration to a normal existence, but rather when the
patient is in the terminal stages of an unremitting, incurable fatal illness. 63
D.

The Decision Makers

One of the difficult issues involved in the treatment of patients in a persistent vegetative state is who should participate
in a decision that treatment should be discontinued. The approaches taken by the various state courts involve the family
and physician either making the decision alone or in combination with judicial approval, the use of ethics committees or prognosis boards, or the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 64 The
following cases illustrate the different approaches.
1.

The Quinlan Approach

The Quinlan court found that the decision to terminate lifesupport systems should be made by the patient's family and
that has a policy that allows the use of "No Code" orders may be found civilly and/or
criminally liable. However, the "No Code" orders policy which has been adopted by the
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for use in Los Angeles County facilities is
indicative of generally accepted practice. It also appears to be generally accepted that
"No Code" orders authorized by the patient or the patient's surrogate decision-maker in
such situations are usually proper. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at
64.
60. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978).
61. Id. at 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
62. Id. at 466-67, 380 N.E.2d at 134-35.
63. Id. at 474, 380 N.E.2d at 138. Due to the highly intrusive nature of resuscitation
procedures and the fact that under some circumstances these procedures merely allow
the patient to continue the inevitable process of dying, doctors sometimes decide against
these measures in cases when an incompetent or terminally ill patient suffers cardiac
arrest. J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 71. FOI: a case study on the magnitude of this
practice in a county hospital, see Levy & Lambe-Shear, Do Not Resuscitate Orders in a
County Hospital, 140 WEST. J. MED. 111 (1984).
64. See infra notes 65-107 and accompanying text.
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physicians, as long as a hospital-appointed ethics committee
concurred with this decision. 611 Judicial intervention was termed
inappropriate, not only because it would be a gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence,
but because it would be impossibly cumbersome. 66 The concept
of an ethics committee, composed of medical and non-medical
personnel, is to serve as an advisory body "to provide a regular
forum for more input and dialogue in individual situations and
'to allow the responsibility of these judgments to be shared. "67
The Quinlan rationale of leaving the choice to the physician and
family, unless disagreement occurs, requires a determination by
the physicians that there is no reasonable possibility that the
patient will return from the comatose state to a cognitive, sapient state,66 a determination by the family of the patient's probable choice, and concurrence of an ethics committee. 69
2. The Saikewicz Approach
In contrast to Quinlan, after the decision in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,7° the Massachusetts courts require the appointment of a guardian and the use
of the judicial system to resolve decisions concerning life-prolonging treatment for incompetent patients. The Saikewicz case
concerned a severely retarded 67 year old man suffering from
acute myelomonocytic leukemia, an invariably fatal disease of
the blood. 71 While chemotherapy is the established treatment
65. 70 N.J. at 54, 355 A.2d at 671.
66. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
67. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 688 (citing Teel, The Physicians' Dilemma: A Doctor's
View: What The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 8 (1975». This concept was criticized in the case of In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 134, 660 P.2d at 749-50.
68. The use of the word "sapient" appears in other cases such as Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647, and is again illustrative of
the problems in terminology in this area. The definition of the word "sapient" is "possessing or expressing great sagacity or discernment," WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY. 1042 (1983). If treatment were required only when it would return a patient
to a sage or discerning state, one could anticipate that medical treatment would not be
required, for example, for those afflicted with Down's Syndrome. This seems unlikely to
be the court's intent. Probably the family of a person in a persistent vegetative state
would be willing to accept a lesser standard of consciousness than "sapient," when assessing the benefits of continued treatment.
69. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
70. 373 Mass. at 756-58, 370 N.E.2d at 432-34.
71. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/4

14

Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support

1985]

TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUPPORT

385

for this disease, the patient's guardian ad litem and attending
physicians advised against the treatment because they felt it was
not in the patient's best interests since the adverse side effects
and discomfort as well as the inability of the patient to understand the treatment outweighed the limited prospect of any benefit.72 The Saikewicz court found that the resolution of the issue
of determining who should decide whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of making his
own decision requires:
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which
the judicial branch of government was created.
Achieving this ideal is [the] responsibility [of the
judiciary] ... , and is not to be entrusted to any
other group purporting to represent the 'morality
and conscience of our society,' no matter how
highly motivated or impressively constituted. 73

Saikewicz is considered the leading case for those jurisdic72. Id. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 419. The physicians stated that chemotherapy would
offer only a 30-40 % chance of remission lasting 2-13 months and no cure. Chemotherapy
would also result in serious adverse side effects, including pain and severe nausea, and
the treatment requires the patient's cooperation over several weeks. Because of his
mental retardation, the patient would be unable to cooperate. The physicians testified
that the patient was in no pain and probably would die painlessly within a matter of
weeks or months if the leukemia ran its natural course without chemotherapy. Id. at 73334, 370 N.E.2d at 421. The Saikewicz court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
medical personnel should not administer chemotherapy. Id. at 735, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
Today some hematologists might question the conclusion that treatment of acutemyelomonocytic leukemia offers no hope of cure. See Wilkinson, Legal Resolution of Denial
of Access to Medical Technology, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 203, 221 (1984).
73. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. The Saikewicz court's holding is illustrative of
some of the problems in terminology in that a distinction should be made between "lifeprolonging treatment," which usually refers to treatment offering some chance of extending the patient's life in a meaningful way, and "life-sustaining treatment" or artificial life support, which serves merely to prolong the patient's existence in a hopeless
comatose state. Note, Law and Medicine-Individual Rights-The Incompetent's Right to
Refuse Treatment, 51 TENN. L. REV. 145, 151-52 n.59 (1983).
In rejecting the Quinlan court's approach with specific reference to 'artificial life-support' and in holding judicial intervention necessary with specific reference to 'potentially life-prolonging treatment,' the Saikewicz court creates ambiguity
about whether it recognizes a distinction between life-prolonging treatment and life-sustaining treatment, or whether it requires judicial intervention in all cases concerning withholding
or withdrawing treatment from incompetents.
Id.
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tions requiring judicial intervention in every case involving the
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from
an incompetent. 74 The Saikewicz decision was clarified to some
degree with respect to "No Code" orders, in Dinnerstein, where
the appellate court held that prior judicial approval is unnecessary in giving orders not to resuscitate where the patient is in
the terminal stages of an unremitting, fatal illness. n Saikewicz
was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case of
In re Spring,76 and followed by the Delaware Supreme Court in
the Severns case. 77
74. 99 Wash. 2d at 125,660 P.2d at 745.
75. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 475, 380 N.E.2d at 138-39. The Dinnerstein court distinguished the Saikewicz situation by the following:
Attempts to apply resuscitation, if successful, will do nothing
to cure or relieve the illnesses which will have brought the patient to the threshold of death. The case does not, therefore,
present the type of significant treatment choice or election
which, in light of sound medical advice, is to be made by the
patient, if competent to do so. The latter is the type of lay
decision which the court in the Saikewicz case had in mind
when it required judicial approval of a negative decision ...
by the physician in attendance and by the family or guardian
of a patient unable to make the choice for himself. This case
does not offer a life-saving or life-prolonging treatment alternative within the meaning of the Saikewicz case. It presents a
question peculiarly within the competence of the medical profession of what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent
passing of an irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of the
patient's history and condition and the wishes of her family.
That question is not one for judicial decision, but one for the
attending physician.
[d. at 474-75, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
76. 380 Mass. at 631, 405 N.E.2d at 117. In a somewhat confusing opinion, the supreme court stated that while prior judicial approval might not exist, once a court is
properly presented with a legal question regarding the withholding of treatment, it must
decide that question and not delegate to some private person or group. [d. at 636-39, 405
N.E.2d at 120-22. The Spring case involved a son seeking to terminate dialysis treatment
for his 79 year old father who suffered from chronic organic brain syndrome and endstage kidney disease which required hemodialysis treatment three days a week, five
hours a day. The patient resisted the treatment which caused unpleasant side effects,
while he would not suffer any side effects if the treatment were terminated. There was
no evidence that the patient when competent had expressed any wish to withdraw treatment in such circumstances. [d. at 632-33, 405 N.E.2d at 118. The supreme court reversed a lower court decision which delegated decision making to the family and physicians. [d. at 630, 405 N.E.2d at 117.
77. 421 A.2d at 1345. The supreme court found that in the absence of statutory
relief, the Court of Chancery (court of equity) was the appropriate authority to grant
relief. [d. at 1344.
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3. The Storar Approach
A third and more conservative approach was taken by the
New York Court of Appeals in consolidating two appeals from
lower court decisions, In re Storar78 and Eichner v. Dillon. 79 In
the first case, In re Storar, the court of appeals reversed a lower
court's decision to discontinue blood transfusions for a 52 year
old severely retarded man suffering from terminal cancer. 80 In
the second case, Eichner v. Dillon, also referred to as the
Brother Fox case, the court of appeals found that a respirator
could be legally removed from an 83 year old patient in a vegetative state where the patient had previously expressed a desire
not to have his life prolonged by artificial means. 81 The ruling of
the Storar court for a Brother Fox-type situation can be summarized as follows: life-sustaining respirators can be withdrawn
from an incompetent patient if there is clear and convincing
proof that the patient, when competent, indicated that would
have been his choice, if he were in a situation without hope of
78. 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46, reu'd, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266. Both Storar and Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd
sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), involved
guardians of incompetent persons objecting to the continued use of medical treatment or
measures to prolong lives of patients diagnosed As fatally ill with no chance of recovery.
In each case the patients died, rendering the controversy moot, yet the appellate court
heard the cases to resolve the issues raised. 52 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 420 N.E.2d at 66-67,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69.
79. 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), aff'd sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
80. 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76. The patient lived in
a state facility where he was visited almost daily by his mother. When doctors recommended that he receive radiation therapy for cancer of the bladder, his mother applied
to be appointed legal guardian to give consent. Although the disease was in remission for
a while, it reoccurred. With transfusions, his life span was estimated to be between three
to six months, while without transfusions death would occur within weeks. He found the
transfusions disagreeable and his mother requested they be discontinued. I d. at 373-74,
420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71. The court found that the patient's fatal
illness had not affected his limited mental ability and that he remained alert and carried
on usual activities. While the transfusions caused him some pain and could not cure the
disease, the pain was not excessive. With the transfusions, the patient could maintain his
usual activities; however, without them, he would bleed to death. Id. at 381-82, 420
N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
81. Id. at 371-72, 379, 420 N.E.2d at 67-68, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70, 274. The
patient, Brother Fox, a member of a Catholic religious order, sustained a cardiac arrest
during surgery to repair a hernia. He was placed on a respirator. After he was diagnosed
as being in a permanent vegetative state, his superior, Father Eichner, requested to be
appointed guardian with authority to direct removal of the respirator. Id. at 370-71, 420
N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
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recovery.82 The court of appeals found that seeking prior judicial
approval might be appropriate but that any such procedure is
optional. 83
4. The Colyer Approach
The Washington Supreme Court modified the Quinlan position regarding the use of ethics committees by requiring the
unanimous concurrence of a prognosis board of physicians to
agree that there was no reasonable medical probability that the
patient would return to a sapient state in the case of In re Colyer. 84 The court also required the judicial appointment of a
guardian prior to decision making by the family and physicians. 8& The Colyer case concerned a husband seeking a court
order to withdraw a respirator from his 69 year old wife who was
in a chronic vegetative state as the result of a cardiopulmonary
arrest. 86 Establishing guidelines for future cases, the Colyer
court found that the courts need no longer be involved once the
appointment of a guardian to assert the rights of the incompetent was completed through the judicial process and the physicians on a prognosis committee agreed on the diagnosis. 87 The
court, however, becomes the final safeguard in this procedure,
either in cases where there is disagreement among physicians on
the prognosis committee, or when any participant in the decision
or member of the family petitions for court intervention. 88
82. [d. at 379,420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
83. [d. at 382-83, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.

84. 99 Wash. 2d at 134, 660 P.2d at 749-50. The prognosis board, composed of the
patient's physician and at least two other disinterested and qualified physicians who
have an understanding of the patient's condition, would be responsible for confirming
the attending physician's diagnosis and would protect against an erroneous diagnosis as
well as questionable motives. The court criticized the Quinlan type of ethics committee
as being too bureaucratic and cumbersome since it would be composed of non-medical
personnel. [d. at 134, 660 P.2d at 749. A slightly different approach, that does not require the judicial appointment of a guardian, was taken by the Florida Supreme Court in
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). In
Bludworth, the Florida Supreme Court found that close family members may refuse extraordinary life-sustaining measures when a patient is certified by a physician to be in a
"permanent vegetative state" if the certification is concurred in by two other physicians.
[d. at 926.
85. [d. at 128-29, 660 P.2d at 746.
86. [d. at 117, 660 P.2d at 740.
87. [d. at 129, 660 P.2d at 746.
88. [d. at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750.
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5. The California Approach
California's response to the question of when to terminate
treatment for patients in a persistent vegetative state is found in
the Natural Death Act89 enacted in 1976, which recognizes a person's right to control medical treatment decisions in the instance
of a terminal condition. 90 Under the Natural Death Act, a competent adult may issue a directive, similar to a will,91 to his physician which will take effect only if the following requirements
are met: (1) the patient is suffering from an incurable injury or
illness; (2) the illness is certified by two physicians as terminal;
(3) the use of life-sustaining procedures would only artificially
prolong the moment of death for the patient; and (4) the attending physician determines death is imminent regardless of
whether such life-sustaining procedures are applied. 92 After
these requirements are met, the physician, if he believes the proposed procedure will not change the prognosis of imminent
death, will be absolved of any further liability for carrying out
the patient's wishes in withholding life-sustaining treatment. 93
Life-sustaining procedure is defined as: (1) any medical technique which uses mechanical or other artificial means to sustain,
restore or supplant a vital function; and (2) serves only to artificially prolong the moment of death. 94 Failure by a physician to
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1984).
90. [d. § 7186. The section in relevant part states that "[AJdult persons have the
fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical
care, including the decisions to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in
instances of a terminal condition." [d.
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186, 7188 (West Supp. 1984). A living will is
another term to describe this type of procedure in that "it controls events at a later time
when the patient is still alive, but incompetent, in contrast to wills devising property
which control events upon a person's death." J. ROBERTSON, supra note 20, at 97. For a
discussion of some of the problems inherent in living wills, see Eisendrath & Jonsen, The
Living Will - Help or Hindrance? J. A.M.A. 2054-58 (1983).
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7186, 7188 (West Supp. 1984). Legislation also
exists to allow the pronouncement of death when there has been a total and irreversible
cessation of brain function. [d. § 7180. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1984). Also, those who act
under the direction of a physician will not be guilty of any criminal act or unprofessional
conduct. [d. The wishes of the patient's family have no effect on a valid and binding
directive. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 58. Withholding life-sustaining procedures in compliance with a directive is not mercy-killing or euthanasia;
rather, it is "a method recognized under California law, by which a physician can respect
a patient's instruction to permit an imminent death to proceed naturally." [d. at 72.
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1984). Life-sustaining procedures do not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical
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effectuate a binding directive will constitute unprofessional conduct, if the physician refuses to make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary steps to effect the transfer
of the patient to another physician who will implement the patient's directive. 911
The difficulty with this legislation lies in its limitations. 96
For example, the Act requires that a directive be made in accord
with prescribed terms, so that if a patient prepares a different
directive, it is ineffective. 97 Furthermore, for the directive to be
binding, the patient must have been informed of the diagnosis of
a terminal condition at least 14 days prior to the time he signs
the directive, so that it does not apply to those who are not diagnosed as terminal at the time of execution, where death may be
weeks, months, or even years away.9S Consequently, the directive
procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain. [d. Death must be considered to be imminent, in the opinion of the attending physician, regardless of whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized. [d.
95. [d. § 7191(b).
96. Note, A Proposed Amendment to the California Natural Death Act to Assure
the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17 U.S.F. L. REV.
579, 605 (1982-1983). Some proposed changes to expand the scope of the Natural Death
Act include allowing (1) any competent adult to execute the directive rather than only
those diagnosed as terminal, (2) any directive to be used with wording that is in substantial compliance with the prescribed form, (3) the directive to be effective until revoked,
and (4) the family of an incompetent patient to assert the patient's rights. [d. at 606-08.
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7187(b), 7188, 7191(c) (West Supp. 1984). Section 7187(b) requires that the written document be executed in accordance with the requirements of § 7188. [d. § 7187(b). However, if the directive is no longer binding, the
attending physician may give weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's directions regarding the withholding of life-sustaining treatment. [d. § 7191(c). In the event of
a non-binding directive, guidelines from the California Hospital Association suggest that
the physician may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures when, in his judgment, death is imminent. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 60. The
physician should also consult the patient's family and consider factors such as information provided by the family, as well as the nature of the patient's illness, disease, or
injury in determining whether the totality of the circumstances justifies effectuating the
directive. [d. The physician should also consult the hospital administrator prior to terminating treatment in cases where the directive was signed before the patient was diagnosed as having a terminal illness. [d.
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1984). "If the declarant
[were) a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or reexecuting the directive,
the directive shall be conclusively presumed ... to be the directions of the patient
.... " [d. A "[q)ualified patient means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be
afflicted with a terminal condition." [d. § 7187(e). A terminal condition is defined to be
an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of the appIrcation of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce
death. [d. § 7187(0.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/4

20

Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support

1985]

TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUPPORT

391

would not be binding on the physician if it were signed by a
patient in good health. Furthermore, a valid directive, unless revoked, is effective for only five years from the date of its
execution. 99
Some of these shortcomings were addressed in 1983 with the
passage of California Civil Code, Section 2434, which permits an
individual to designate an attorney-in-fact who has the durable
power of attorney over health care decisions when the individual
becomes incompetent. loo The statute which provides for oral and
written revocation requires that two non-interested witnesses attest that the principal appears to be of sound mind. lol This legislation is naturally restricted by the need for the individual to
have designated an attorney-in-fact prior to becoming incompetent and the fact that the designation lasts for a period of only
seven years, unless at the end of the seven years the principal
lacks capacity to make health care decisions for himself.l02 When
a patient who has designated an attorney-in-fact for health care
decisions becomes incompetent, the designated attorney-in-fact
should be consulted. l03 An order to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment cannot be issued without the concurrence
of the attorney-in-fact unless specific court authorization has
been secured. l04 Assuming that the durable power of attorney
for health care is executed properly, it provides a good method
for effectuating the wishes of patients in a persistent vegetative
99. [d. § 7189.5. There is no criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for
failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to statute unless that person had actual
knowledge of the revocation. [d. § 7189(3)(b).
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1984). An attorney-in-fact may not make
health care decisions unless the principal is unable to give informed consent. [d. The
attorney-in-fact also has priority over any other person to act for the principal in all
matters of health care decisions. [d. Health care refers to any care, treatment, or procedure to maintain, diagnose or treat the patient's physical or mental condition. [d.
2430(b). Health care decisions refer to consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent to health care. [d. § 2430(c).
101. [d. § 2432. Witnesses may not be health care providers, operators of community facilities, or their employees. [d. § 2432B(d)(I)(4)(5). Furthermore, at least one witness shall not be an heir by devise or intestacy or a relative. [d. § 2432(B)(e)(I)(2). The
durable power of attorney is not effective, if a principal is a patient in a nursing facility,
unless one of the witnesses is a patient advocate or ombudsman. [d. § 2432(B)(0.
102. [d. § 2436.5.
103. [d. § 2434(a). This power does not allow the attorney-in-fact to consent to commitment in a mental health treatment facility, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, sterilization, or abortion. [d. § 2435(a)-(e).
104. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66r.
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state, since the responsibility of the attorney-in-fact is to act in
a manner consistent with the desires of the patient. 105
In addition to this legislation, in 1981, a joint Biomedical
Ethics Committee of the Los Angeles County Bar Association
and Los Angeles Medical Association along with the local District Attorney's Office and the County Coroner's Office, issued
guidelines for withdrawing respirators from terminally ill patients. loa Under these guidelines, a respirator can be removed in
three instances: (1) when the patient has suffered a total and
irreversible cessation of brain function, i.e., brain death; (2)
under the provisions of the California Natural Death Act; or (3)
when the patient's medical record contains a written diagnosis of
an irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state. 107 These
guidelines, however, do not discuss the removal of food and
water.
Consequently, in California, while there are medical guidelines for the termination of treatment of patients in a persistent
vegetative state, the guidelines have no statutory authority regarding termination of treatment unless the patient meets the
standard of brain death, has previously designated an attorneyin-fact, or has executed a binding directive to authorize termination. The Barber case is an illustration of some of the problems
that can arise in California due to the absence of legislation regarding the termination of treatment for patients in a persistent
vegetative state.
III. THE BARBER DECISION

A.

The Factual Setting and Procedural History

In Barber, a unanimous three judge appellate court panel
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2434 (West Supp. 1984). If the patient's desires are unknown,
the attorney-in-fact is to act in the best interests of the patient. [d.
106. JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS OF THE Los ANGELES MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION AND THE Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, Guidelines for Discontinuance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support Systems under Specified Circumstances, (1981)
[hereinafter cited as JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE). These guidelines have been endorsed by
the California Medical Association and the California Hospital Association. CALIFORNIA
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 62.
107. JOINT AD Hoc COMMITTEE, supra note 106.
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from the Second Appellate District held that Doctors Barber
and Nedjl were not guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit
murder for removing a respirator, other life-sustaining equipment, intravenous feeding, and nasogastric tubes from a 55 year
old comatose patient over a three to five day period. 1OS The circumstances precipitating removal occurred after successful completion of routine surgery for closure of an ileostomy, when the
patient, Clarence Herbert, suffered a cardiorespiratory arrest in
the recovery room. 109 Reasons for the cardiorespiratory arrest remain uncertain.1l0 The patient was resuscitated by a medical
team and immediately placed on a respirator. ll1
Within the three days following the arrest, Doctors Barber
and Nedjl determined that Mr. Herbert had suffered severe
brain damage that left him in a persistent vegetative state.ll2
This determination was made as a result of tests and examinations made by several physicians, including Doctors Barber (Mr.
Herbert's internist) and Nedjl, (Mr. Herbert's surgeon).1l3 At
that time, the defendants informed Mr. Herbert's family of their
opinion of his condition and chances for recovery.1I4 Following
this meeting, the family convened and drafted a written request
to the hospital indicating they wanted all life-sustaining machines removed. lUi Consequently, three days after the cardiorespiratory arrest, the respirator was disconnected. Mr. Herbert
continued to breathe after removal of the respirator, but showed
no signs of improvement, such as recovery of consciousness.1I8
108. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
109. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
110. L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1983, Part II at 1. The prosecution dismissed the defense
suggestion that the coma could be attributed to cardiac problems since the defendants
did not consider Mr. Herbert's heart history serious. If, however, this were accurate, the
prosecution contended Mr. Herbert's doctors were deemed negligent in allowing him to
undergo elective surgery and failing to allow extra precautions in monitoring. The prosecution also alleged that due to understaffing and insufficient monitoring, Mr. Herbert's
difficulties went unnoticed until he was found cyanotic in the recovery room. Steinbock,
The Removal of Mr. Herbert's Feeding Tube, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 13-14 (1983).
111. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
112. Id.
113. [d.
114. Id. There was some dispute as to the precise terminology used by the doctors.

Mrs. Herbert testified she had been 'told that her husband's brain was dead, yet the
brain, by definition, was not dead since there was still lower brain function. L.A. Times,
supra note 50, at I, 6.
115. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
116. Id.
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Two days later, the defendants, after consulting with the family,
ordered the removal of the intravenous tubes which provided
nourishment and hydration. ll7 Six days later Mr. Herbert
died. 118
The murder and conspiracy to murder charges were initially
dismissed by the magistrate who concluded that (1) the defendants did not "kill" Mr. Herbert since their conduct was not the
proximate cause of death (the principal cause listed on the death
certificate was diffuse encephalomalacia); (2) the defendants'
conduct under the circumstances was the result of good faith,
ethical and sound medical judgment and not unlawful; and (3)
the defendants' state of mind did not amount to malice. ll9 The
superior court judge reinstated the complaint since he concluded
that "as a matter of law the petitioners' conduct, however well
motivated, and however ethical or sound in the eyes of the medical profession, was, under California law, 'unlawful.' "l20 The defendants then petitioned the court of appeal for a review of the
trial court ruling. 121 The court of appeal issued a peremptory
writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from taking further
action in the matter other than to vacate its order reinstating
117. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Testimony at the preliminary hearing by an
attending nurse indicated that two days after the respirator was removed, two family
members at Mr. Herbert's bedside were adamant that the intravenous tubes should be
removed. The nurse refused to remove the tubes because she had no order from a doctor.
Shortly thereafter she received the order. L.A. Times, supra note 50, at 1. After the
removal of the intravenous tubes, Mr. Herbert received nursing care which preserved his
dignity and provided a clean and hygienic environment. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 486.
118. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 13. Mr. Herbert died from dehydration and pneumonia.ld.
119. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The charges were brought
following information given by a nursing supervisor who went to the authorities because
she disagreed with the defendants' actions. At the preliminary lw.aring the prosecution
alleged that even if the removal of the respirator were legal in other contexts, it was part
of a conspiracy to kill Mr. Herbert to hide malpractice. The prosecution claimed that
malpractice occurred since basic medical standards of care were not followed in the recovery room and if the standards had been followed, the injury to Mr. Herbert's brain
could have been prevented. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 13-14.
120. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The decision to reinstate
charges was apparently based neither on the prosecution's "cover up" theory, nor on
acceptance of any important legal difference between disconnecting a respirator and removal of intravenous feeding tubes, but rather that California law does not allow anyone
to shorten another's life, and that the magistrate failed to find Mr. Herbert's condition
irreversible. Steinbock, supra note 110, at 15.
121. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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the complaint and to enter a new order denying the prosecution's motion for reinstatement of the charges. 122 The reversal
writ issued by the appellate court was based on the grounds that
existing state legislation did not require guardianship proceedings or judicial approval prior to the termination of treatment. 123
Moreover, the court found that the failure to continue treatment, though intentional and with the knowledge that the patient would die, was not an unlawful breach of legal duty. 124
B.

The Court's

Reas~ning

The Barber court, expressing a reluctance to evaluate the
petitioners' conduct in the context of the inadequate framework
of the criminal law, began its review by stating that the issues in
this case required determination against a background of legal
and moral considerations which had not as yet been adequately
addressed by the legislature. 1211 Having established that existing
legislation did not address withdrawal of life-support systems
for patients in a persistent vegetative state, the court found that
the termination of life-support measures is not an affirmative
act, but rather an omission or withdrawal of further treatment. 128 The court reasoned that the withdrawal of mechanical
support devices is comparable to withholding manual administration of medicines. 127
The court then turned its inquiry to the issue of whether
the withdrawal of treatment, i.e., the failure to act, was a breach
of a legal duty, and found that there was no duty to continue
treatment once it has proved to be ineffective. 128 The court
stated that "[a]lthough there may be a duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the immediate aftermath of a cardio-re122. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
123. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
124. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
125. Id. at lOll, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court also determined that the California
Natural Death Act did not represent the exclusive basis for terminating life-support
equipment in CcJifornia. [d. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
126. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1017-18,195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91. The main issue becomes one of "determining the duties owed by a physician to a patient who has been reliably diagnosed as in
a comatose state from which any meaningful recovery of cognitive brain function is exceedingly unlikely." Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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spiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it has
become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel."129
The court also determined that there was no rational distinction between the use of respirators and the provision of nutrition and hydration in situations such as Barber. ISO The court
found that respirators, nutrition and hydration are forms of lifesupport and should be regarded in the same manner as any
other medical procedure, rather than as typical human ways of
providing nutrition and hydration. lSI Hence, the court concluded
that medical nutrition and hydration may not always provide
net benefits to patients. ls2
Disagreeing with the Quinlan and Saikewicz approaches of
distinguishing which life-sustaining procedure should be used
and for how long its use must be maintained in terms of ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, ISS the Barber court
found a benefits and burdens test more logical. IS. Under this test
the decision to continue treatment is made by considering
whether the treatment will provide benefits which outweigh the
burdens to the patient. m Therefore, the burden of even a minimally intrusive treatment maybe disproportionate to its benefits
when the patient's prognosis is hopeless. lSG The court concluded
this situation was applicable to the Barber case, based on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, which supported the
conclusions that "Mr. Herbert had virtually no chance of recovering his cognitive or motor functions. "lS7
129. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
130. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court found that the intravenous admin-

istration of nourishment and fluids is the same as the use of the respirator in that one is
a mechanical feeding device and the other is a mechanical breathing device. Id. at 101617, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 192 n.52).
131. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. This evaluation would consider the benefits and burdens of providing nutrition. Id.
132. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Although this position is consistent with the
findings of the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 190, it remains controversial. See CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 63.
133. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 47-48,355 A.2d at 667-68; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
738, 370 N.E.2d at 423-24.
134. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
135. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The court stated that:

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss2/4

26

Brutoco: Termination of Life-Support

1985]

TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUPPORT

397

Acknowledging that there was no applicable legislation requiring the appointment of a legal guardian, the Barber court
found that Mrs. Herbert (the decedent's wife) and children were
the proper persons to determine the best interests of the patient. 138 The court stated that any surrogate ought to be guided
by knowledge of the patient's own desires, or if this were not
possible, by what would be in the patient's best interests. ls9 Finally, based on the absence of applicable legislation requiring legal proceedings, the court concurred with the Quinlan decision
by determining that prior judicial approval of the decision to
terminate treatment was unnecessary and possibly unwise. 140
IV. ANALYSIS

A.

The Problem

While appropriately acknowledging the drawbacks of designing an ethical and moral code for doctors through the prosecution of a lawsuit,14l the Barber court inadequately addressed
[t)he most optimistic prognosis provided by any of the testifying experts was that the patient had an excellent chance of
'recovery.' However, recovery was defined in terms of a spectrum running from a persistent vegetative state to full recovery. A persistent vegetative state was described as that state in
which the patient would have no contact with the environment but parts of the brain would continue to live. The doctor
who was of course approaching the case after the fact and
from a hindsight view, was unable to predict where on this
continuum Mr. Herbert was likely to end up. Several studies
on which the expert relied, however, indicated that the
chances for unimpaired or full recovery were miniscule. The
results of these studies coincided with the diagnoses of the
physicians who had actually examined and dealt with the patient before his demise.
[d.

138. [d. at 1021 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 n.2. The court acknowledged that
"[d)espite the fact that Mr. Herbert apparently entered the name of his sister-in-law on
a hospital form (the purpose of which was unclear from the evidence), his wife and children were the most obviously appropriate surrogates in this case." [d. The court also
referred to evidence that Mr. Herbert had previously expressed to his wife that he would
not want to be kept alive by machines. [d. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
139. [d.
140. [d. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
141. [d. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court stated that "a murder prosecution
is a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced with decisions concerning the use of costly and extraordinary 'life support' equipment." [d.
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some of the crucial issues involved. The most serious problem
with the decisions made by the doctors and family members in
this case was the unusually short length of time within which
they made their decision to discontinue life-support systems.142
Within three days from the date of the cardiorespiratory arrest,
Mr. Herbert was disconnected from his respirator,143 and two
days later he was disconnected from intravenous feeding based
on a determination by his physicians that he was in a persistent
vegetative state. I44 Significant medical authority and case law
exist to indicate that the irreversibility of a coma cannot be determined within so short a time. HI! Moreover, in the Barber case,
there was no clearly documented diagnosis of irreversible coma
which would meet the Los Angeles County Guidelines for Discontinuance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support Systems Under
Specified Circumstances to allow for disconnecting a respira142. See infra note 145.
143. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
144. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
145. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 168-69 & n.52; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DEFINING
DEATH, supra note 2, at 92-95, 98-99 (1981); A Definition of Irreversible Coma, Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337 (1968). See also In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 144-45, 660
P.2d at 754-55, (Dore, J. dissenting). Justice Dore objected to 25 days as being an unacceptable time period for determining whether the patient in Colyer would have recovered brain functions. Id. at 145, 660 P.2d at 755. He claimed that other similar cases
provide little legal support for withdrawing life-support mechanisms in such a short
time. Id. at 144, 660 P.2d at 754 (citing Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728,380 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
38 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.W. 2d 64; Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc.
1, 22 Ohio Op. 3d 49, 426 N.E.2d 809). He concludes:
Leach allowed termination of life supporting mechanisms
in 4 months; Severns in 5 months; the Quinlan case, after 1
year. The other two cases, Saikewicz and Storar, involved
noncomatose individuals, both of whom were retarded. The
majority opinion [in Colyer] represents the most liberal interpretation in the United States as to the length of time an incompetent must remain on a life supporting mechanism before
it can be medically determined there is no reasonable possibility of the incompetent ever emerging from the present comatose condition to a cognitive sapient state.
Evidence presented to the trial court by the attending
physicians has shown that Bertha Colyer was indeed alive, and
a finding was made by the trial court to that effect. There do
exist documented medical instances when fact patterns similar
to the one at bar were present and the patient ultimately survived, although these cases are rare.
Id. at 144, 660 P.2d at 754.
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tor. us Thus, the Barber court has sanctioned not only controversial but precipitous medical actions, without substantial legal or
medical support. 147
In addition, there is no clear legal or medical consensus as
to whether nourishment and hydration should be discontinued
when the patient is in a persistent vegetative state. 148 Certainly,
as the Barber court found, the distinction made between withholding air and withholding food and water, may be based more
on emotional symbolism than on rational differences. H9 However, if nourishment is considered basic comfort care to ease the
dying process, it may be required and, therefore, distinguished
from the use of a respirator.1IIO Also, a difference exists as to the
level of pain and suffering involved when distinguishing between
the withdrawal of a respirator and the withdrawal of nourishment and hydration. un When the respirator is withheld, little
suffering or pain is involved.U2 However, death from starvation
and/or dehydration may take from several days to several weeks
and may cause pain and suffering depending on the level of patient awareness and the medications provided. 1I13 Assuming that
in certain limited situations, where the patient is in a persistent
vegetative state, withholding nutrition and hydration should be
the accepted practice, the question that still remains is whether
the physicians in Barber acted too quickly in removing the
respirator.
146. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 54 (Cum. Supp. 1983). There was no written diag·
nosis of irreversible coma as required under the guidelines. Moreover, since Mr. Herbert's wife had filed a civil malpractice suit (cite omitted) and there was conflicting evidence as to what information was given to the family, the necessity for documentation
avoids argument and uncertainty after the fact. [d.
147. See supra note 145.
148. See supra note 55. Also the California Hospital Association recognized this issue as controversial by contrasting the findings of the President's Commission with the
Department of Health and Human Services' handicapped infant regulations. CALIFORNIA
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 63.
149. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
150. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 62-63 (Cum. Supp. 1983). Comfort care is not affected by a hopeless or terminal diagnosis and is required to accord the patient as dignified a death as reasonably possible. [d. at 62 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
151. [d. at 63 (Cum. Supp. 1983). When death results from the withdrawal of the
respirator, the patient becomes unconscious several minutes after withdrawal and suffers
brain death shortly afterwards. [d.
152. [d.
153. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

29

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 4

400

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 15:371

Resolution
1. Statutory Resolution

Resolution of some of the termination of life-support issues
for patients in a persistent vegetative state, could be accomplished by statute. For example, the Los Angeles County Guidelines for Discontinuance of Cardiopulmonary Life-Support
Systems Under Specified Circumstances could be adopted or a
minimum time frame could be established before a respirator is
disconnected. However, revisions in statutory law often can not
keep pace with the ongoing medical and technological advances
that consistently present new legal and ethical issues. Moreover,
statutes while helpful, are an unsatisfactory way to resolve issues
where medical uncertainty still exists and further ethical discussion is necessary. For example, in cases concerning the withdrawal of nutrition or the determination of the patient's best interests, it would be difficult for a statute to address all of the
individual variations present in a particular case. However, a
statute could require health care facilities to establish ethics
committees for resolution of those issues which cannot be addressed directly by statute.
2.

Ethics Committees

Because of the lack of medical and legal consensus, the most
promising approach to resolving decisions regarding the withdrawal of life-support systems appears to be the Quinlan concept of an ethics committee. A committee allows the responsibility of judgment to be shared in cases where no guidelines have
been established and the proposition is controversial, such as the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. The ethics committee
approach allows for a case-by-case evaluation to take into account the differences that impact and affect each decision.
Although ethics committees are recommended by the California Hospital Association to assist with decisionmaking,1114
154. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 66(d)-66(e). Ethics committees would serve to perform such functions as assisting in the formulation of hospital
.policies pertaining to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, serving as a
resource to those involved in biomedical and ethical decisions, and providing a forum for
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they are not found in most hospitals. Less than 20 % of the acute
care hospitals in the United States had ethics committees in
1982.11111 One of the largest problems facing the formation of ethics committees is physician resistance. IlI6 There is a fear among
some physicians that the physician-patient relationship will be
destroyed or a committee will dictate rules on what is a private
matter. However, an ethics committee can be structured to provide guidance, not to be the ultimate arbiter. The purpose of a
committee is to spell out those values that constitute the context
in which individual prudence must operate. m Although this approach, depending on the structure and specific function of the
committee, may remove some autonomy from the treating physicians and family, its advantages can be likened to the value of
multi-judge courts in resolving difficult questions of law on
appeal. IllS
Another major objection to ethics committees is the lack of
clinical knowledge of committee members.IlI9 There is a concern
that members with a non-clinical background will not be able to
understand sufficiently the medical details upon which medical
judgment is based. Although there is substance to this objection,
it should function as a challenge rather than as an obstacle. I60
Medical personnel must have the ability to translate, while nonclinical members must familiarize themselves with medical terminology.I61 This is meant to insure the patient's best interest to
be viewed as a broad human judgment, rather than simply a scidiscussion about biomedical ethical issues. [d.
155. Jonsen, A.R., What is Extraordinary Life Support? Medical Staff Conference,
University of California, San Francisco, 141 WEST J. MED. 358, 362 (Sept. 1984). The
University of San Francisco h!lS had an ethics committee for seven years. [d. The committee is composed of seven doctors, two nurses, a chaplin, an attorney, and a professor
of ethics in medicine, and unanimous decisions are reached on all cases. Even when it
has no referrals, the ethics committee meets monthly to address policy questions. Information as to the University of San Francisco's ethics committee was provided by a telephone interview with Albert R. Jonsen, Professor of Ethics in Medicine and Chief, Division of Biomedical Ethics, Department of Medicine, University of California, San
Francisco on November 26, 1984.
156. McCormick, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH
CARE, 150, 153 (Sept. 1984).
157. [d. at 153.
158. 90 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
159. McCormick, supra note 156, at 154.
160. [d. at 153.
161. [d.
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entific judgment. I62
While an ethics committee can complicate the decision
making process by merely multiplying the number of opinions as
to appropriate treatment, the availability of a vehicle for consultation is desirable. I6s The committee need not be involved for
the majority of cases. However, whenever disagreement or uncertainty exist, the involvement of such an ethics committee is
of value. I64 The hospital itself could specify the types of cases
which would come under the ethics committee review.
Besides using an ethics committee for cases where there is
medical uncertainty, an ethics committee is best suited to take
into account a variety of economic considerations. For example,
government has limited resources. I611 Competing demands are
made on these resources and medical need is only one of those
forces seeking the maximum allocation from the available
sources. I66 Economic factors cannot be ignored when resources
are scarce and an alternate allocation of the resources and personnel might benefit other patients more. On the other hand,
since Medicare and Medicaid payments are set, regardless of
length of time or treatment provided, there may be a need for
ethics committees to constrain inappropriate financial considerations regarding treatment decisions that have little relationship
to the patient's best interests. I67
162. [d. at 154.

163. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 444-45.
164. [d. at 445.

165. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 174.
166. [d.

167. The prosecution at the preliminary hearing in the Barber case had tried to
show that the defendants and the hospital benefitted financially from Mr. Herbert's demise. However, the municipal court judge ruled that evidence on the financial state of
the hospital and its arrangements with its doctors is irrelevant in determining whether
sufficient evidence of murder existed for a trial. L.A. Times, supra note 50, at I, 6. See
also McCormick, supra note 156, at 152, for a discussion of the emergence of economic
considerations in operating health care facilities for profit and in the use of salaried employee physicians.
Not only can economic factors influence a physician's opinion regarding the discontinuation of life-support systems, but these factors can also affect the family. The overwhelming cost of medical care can influence the decisions of the family regarding the
prolongation of intensive treatments for those family members who are in a persistent
vegetative state. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, supra note 3, at 185 n.35.
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Thus, the concept of shared judgment in decision making
allows for consideration of all of these factors (medical, ethical,
economic, and legal), with more detached investigation, than if
left solely to the treating physicians and the family. For example, while responsibility is diffused for an obviously difficult decision where the ethical and medical dimensions are complex,
this diffusion can allow a more truly informed and less self-protective prognosis and treatment or non-treatment recommendation to be made. I68 Moreover, in the absence of statutory law in
this area, this approach places the treating physicians in a better
position if subsequent litigation occurs. I6S
The ethics committee, composed of lay persons and medical
personnel, provides a broader prospective than a prognosis
board. However, the prognosis board is an alternative that does
increase participation in decision making. Because of the seriousness of a decision to withdraw life-support systems, the value
of a multidisciplinary approach of an ethics committee which
takes into account legal and ethical perspectives, in addition to
the medical perspectives which are considered by a prognosis
board, seems to have more advantages than a prognosis board.
Either an ethics committee or a prognosis board would have
provided support for the physicians in the Barber case, since
withdrawal of all life-support systems, including intravenous
feeding devises, after five days is not a universally accepted
medical practice.no The only necessity for judicial intervention
would be in cases where there is a disagreement by the ethics
committee or prognosis board as to treatment procedures. The
Colyer court adequately outlined the situations requiring judicial intervention in the decision to withdraw life-support systems. I71 Even the Quinlan court, which held that as a general
procedure judicial intervention is unnecessary, found that
168. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 444.
169. As long as the concern over civil and criminal liability exists, a recommendation from an ethics committee can confirm the diagnosis made by the physician, the
appropriateness of discontinuing further treatment a'3 proposed, and that such action is
consistent with accepted medical practice. Thus, the physician is insulated from a malpractice claim. Also, a decision that is sometimes viewed with fear or suspicion receives
more social acceptability. D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 383 & n.9.
170. See generally D. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 382; CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 36.
171. 99 Wash. 2d at 137,660 P.2d at 751. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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"[t]his is not to say that in the case of an otherwise justifiable
controversy access to the courts would be foreclosed; we speak
rather of a general practice and procedure."172 Although the
Barber court cited Quinlan to find judicial intervention unnecessary, the Barber court apparently ignored this specific exception
which was found in Quinlan. 17s Consequently, not only the interests of the patient, but also the interests of the treating physician in avoiding civil and criminal liability, require the use of
an ethics committee, or in the alternative, court approval, to
provide additional input regarding judgment in the frontier areas of medical decisionmaking, such as withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration, or a determination as to the irreversibility of a
coma.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Barber court has taken a major step in establishing
California legal standards for the withdrawal of life-support
treatment from patients in a persistent vegetative state. This decision arose due to a lack of adequate legislative or medical
guidelines in this area. To apply the Barber holding may be to
encourage precipitous withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, as
well as respirators, for patients who in fact have a chance of recovery or whose chances of recovery have been inadequately assessed. In addition, even with the Barber decision, the physician
may still risk civil or criminal liability.174
The better alternative is for the legal and medical professions to encourage the legislature to bypass Barber and revise
existing statutes or establish procedural guidelines responsive to
the needs of the patient in a persistent vegetative state. The
statute or guidelines must address the issues of: (1) decision
making for those patients who have not previously expressed
their wishes concerning the extent of care, (2) withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, and (3) when court intervention is appropriate. Moreover, a statute or guidelines must require the use of
ethics committees to insure maximum protection of each indi172. 90 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
173. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493, where the court
apparently did not see that any justiciable controversy was involved in this particular
situation.
174. See supra note 16.
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vidual's rights and be responsive to technological changes. Finally, it is necessary that the statute or guidelines make an adequate statement exonerating the physician from criminal
liability.

Sheila Brutoco*

* Golden Gate School of Law, Class of 1986.
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